



National Aeronautics and Space Administration





Dryden Flight Research Center

- Procurement Quality Assurance has developed a comprehensive process that outlines our suppliers capabilities and exposes their deficiencies.
 - Business model (Type of Distributor, OCM, Independent, broker etc.)
 - Quality Management System (QMS) employed, if any
 - Certifications (ISO 9001, AS9100, AS9120, etc.)
 - Evaluate previous business relationship with Agency
 - Examine current Counterfeit Avoidance processes
 - Investigate any negative remarks within GIDEP, DLA, State Dept., FAA, ERAI (Pre 9/11 environment)
 - Traceability of parts



Supplier Database

Dryden Flight Research Center Qualified Suppliers List

Supplier Information

<i>SolTec Electronics</i>	
POC:	<input type="text"/>
Address	<input type="text"/>
City	Rockledge
State	FL
Zip	32955
TelNo	<input type="text"/>
Email:	<input type="text"/>
Website:	http://soltecelectronics.com
DateAdded:	1/31/2012

Survey Sent	<input type="text" value="1/22/2012"/>
Survey Received	<input type="text" value="1/26/2012"/>
Survey:	
Certifications:	
Supplier Assessment:	
Waiver:	<input type="text"/>
Waiver Exp:	<input type="text"/>
Approval Status	Qualified <input type="text"/> Risk Grid <input type="text" value="4C"/>
Scope of Approval:	Aircraft Electronics <input type="text"/>
AS9100 Cert Expiration:	<input type="text"/>
ISO 9001 Cert Expiration:	<input type="text" value="3/14/2014"/>
AS9120 Cert Expiration:	<input type="text"/>
ASA 100 Cert:	<input type="text"/>
FAA Repair Station:	<input type="text"/>
Electronic Risk Level	Low/Moderate <input type="text"/>
Score Number:	<input type="text" value="72"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> OCM <input type="checkbox"/> OEM <input type="checkbox"/> Franchised <input type="checkbox"/> Authorized <input type="checkbox"/> Aftermarket <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Independent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Stocking <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Broker <input type="checkbox"/> Repair Station	



Procurement Quality Assurance Research

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Operates under AS5553, recently certified in AS9120. All components sold are brought in house for testing prior to shipping.




NASA Supplement to NDAA

- No later than 270 days after enactment, the Administrator shall revise the NASA Supplement to the FAR
- “Trusted Suppliers” defined as Original Component Manufactures (OCM’s) and authorized suppliers who have a contract with the OCM to sell their products
- NASA may identify trusted suppliers that have policies and procedures in place to detect and avoid counterfeit parts
- The selection of such trusted suppliers is subject to review and audit by NASA officials



New Supplier Additions/Forecast


Suppliers added since Oct 2011





Current Electronic Suppliers

Electronic Suppliers





Agency Risk Mitigation

- First Federal agency to formally promulgate a counterfeit part mitigation strategy (NASA Parts Policy Document 8730.2).
- NASA has procured and utilizes IDEA STD 1010.
- Initiated and chaired SAE G-19 Technical Committee.
- Served as primary developer and editor on first draft of SAE AS6081.
- Provided numerous awareness presentations to various internal and external communities of practice.



Agency Risk Mitigation

- NASA Quality Leadership Forums have included over three dozen presentations related to counterfeit parts in the past five years).
- Developed comprehensive counterfeit parts database (including ERAI data!).
- Developed and provided counterfeit parts awareness training to over 300 persons from NASA, other Government agencies, and private industry.
- Chaired two (of eight) White House Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator Working Groups.



Agency Tactical Approach

- The efforts of NASA and its supplier base to avert a counterfeit escape.
- What is being done at NASA that is different (less effective or more effective, other) than what is being done elsewhere in the supply chain.
- Is the NDAA being perceived as “over-reaching”, “overly invasive”, “not strong enough”, etc?
- What efforts are being made by NASA to educate its suppliers and others relative to counterfeit parts?



Avert a Counterfeit Escape

- Requiring more stringent inspections be performed by suppliers.
- Based on criticality of project requirements, additional measures will be instituted by NASA.
- Increased evaluations of suppliers capabilities.



NASA Difference

- Increased assessment of critical flow path of procured components and full traceability.
- Suppliers that operate as a “pass through” even though they “trust” their suppliers stand a greater chance of not being considered a “Trusted Supplier”.
- Suppliers are still subject to assessments even though they scored high on the electronics survey.



NDAA Perception

- Imposing strict penalties (Prison/Fines) will cause distributors to think twice about products sold.
- Incorporating the “Due Diligence” verbiage will require suppliers to take action to suspend/debar their suppliers for repeated failure to detect and avoid counterfeit parts.
- We believe that H.R. 1540 is the beginning to even more regulations as a result of the changes incorporated.



NASA Education of its Suppliers

- Specific requirements are being readdressed to align with current NASA policy and shared with suppliers.
- New electronic component surveys are being sent out to our electronic suppliers and scored to show risk level.
- NASA as an Agency is narrowing down the specifics of what qualifies as a “Trusted Supplier” and will publish specific requirements to all suppliers when accomplished.



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